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Abstract 
We extend Axelrod & Bennett’s method of alliance prediction, based loosely on the 
“Spin-Glass” theory of magnetism, to include the possibility of a neutral camp. We also 
explore the effect of physical separation between players. Using the second European 
war data, we demonstrate that either one of these extensions is sufficient to move 
Portugal out of the Axis camp, where it was previously found. If neutrality is allowed, 
then Portugal is found in that camp by itself. Without a neutral camp, Portugal is placed 
in the Allied camp if affinities decay with characteristic lengths of ~2000km. Most 
importantly, the consistency of results under such non-trivial alterations, provides 
incremental evidence for the robustness of the model as an empirical tool. 
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1. Introduction 
Axelrod and Bennett (1) (hereinafter AB) introduced a novel analogy between the energy 
of a physical system and the collective discomfort of a population of interacting players 
in forming alliances during conflict. This scheme produced intriguingly accurate results 
relative to observation in the case of the European war c1939-45. The accuracy was so 
out of character, given the usual expectations for “models” in social sciences, that 
feelings that the approach is too-good-to-be-true, have persisted by many; hence a 
motivation for the present study. Resistance to attempts to unravel the model’s 
accuracy using plausible but non-trivial changes will lend incremental support to the 
credibility of the entire approach. More specifically, a point of contention has been that 
the model has artificially fixed certain fundamental aspects in its prescription so as to 
coax its predictions towards the observed answer. Here we address one the most 
prominent aspects in this class of criticisms: the restriction of the model to only two 
camps, especially the lack of neutrality as a choice for the players.  
 
Why is the neutrality feature an important extension of the method? For one, some 
investigators have conjectured that it could not be done in the context of the energy-
minimization method(2,3). Moreover, neutrality seems a very compelling possibility 
(required in many other applications as well) for handling which the methodology was 
not given by AB. 
 
  
Page 3 of  39 
Finding the neutral camp is one of the two motivations for the present work. The other is 
to find evidence which incrementally supports or deprecates the basic credibility of the 
model by way of its consistency under major (but plausible) variations relative to its 
original formulation. To this end we will consider one other feature incorporating a 
qualitatively different type of input to the model. The model heretofore never included 
any variables pertaining to the actual physical world in which the player exist, such as 
the physical distance between players. Thus testing the sensitivity of the model’s 
performance to the physical separation of the players can be taken as incremental 
evidence of its robustness(4). 
 
AB analogized the pairwise interaction strength to that of the pairwise “affinity” between 
two players. The negative sign of interaction for a repulsive, versus the attractive 
positive sign, is implicit in the affinity value assigned to a pair. Although there is no 
fundamental reason for doing so, the value of affinity is assumed symmetric between a 
pair of players. The collection of pairwise affinities constitute a symmetric matrix Ai j. 
 
The affinity itself is computed as the amount of “relative overlap” (or lack thereof) in 
various religious, cultural, and historical attributes of players in a pair. In simple terms 
this is an unweighted scoring system. Since the likes and dislikes between “larger” 
players could be reasonably assumed to affect the system (lower or raise its energy) 
more than pairs involving smaller players, we can say Ai j is akin to the  
  
Page 4 of  39 
energy per unit “size” of the pair. Therefore,  Ai j is subsequently weighted by the size of 
two players in the pair. In this way the “size” of a player can be analogized to the 
(absolute) value of its “charge” in the interaction. 
 
Finally in the context of opposing camps, it is expected that a positive (weighted-)affinity 
within a pair should encourage the two players to be in the same camp, while negative 
values should encourage their placement in opposing camps. The nominal hypothesis is 
thus: the most preferred configuration is that with the lowest energy. If the pairwise 
(size-weighted) affinity represents the contribution of the pair to the energy of the 
system, then the model chooses the contribution of each pairwise affinity so that 
positive/negative affinities in the same/opposite camps should lower the total energy. 
We achieve this by a simple device representing the “distance” between the camps. 
This is not to be confused with any kind of physical separation, as the camps 
themselves have no physical position. More explicitly, in the case of only two camps, 
the set of these distances constitute a matrix di j, where an element takes on the value 
zero when both players i and j are in the same camp, and the value +1 when they are in 
opposing camps. In the case of three or more camps, one possibility is to have a 
distance of zero when two players are in the same camp, and +1 otherwise. That would 
imply that the three camps are ideologically equidistant. We will demonstrate later, 
however, when one of the (at least three) camps is neutral, the distance function needs 
to be a bit more complicated. The availability of neutrality to the players seems as 
paramount as the belligerent camps especially in cases of high-cost/mortal conflict. We 
are also interested in neutrality because in the case of the European war (c1939-45), 
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under the AB model, the most glaring discrepancy was that of a neutral player 
(Portugal) being assigned to the least likely (Axis) camp. Therefore, a good test of the 
model would be to see if a neutral camp were allowed, would Portugal still be predicted 
to belong to the Axis side? 
 
Having spelled out the analogy to physical systems, we can see that the players 
themselves can be analogized to magnetic dipoles (albeit of different sizes) which are 
randomly oriented. These elemental magnets will interact with one another and attempt 
to align themselves so that they find the most comfortable overall configuration. In true 
magnetism this configuration always corresponds to the state of lowest potential energy; 
much like a ball left on a slope will seek the lowest point in its terrain. 
 
The AB’s method then superficially resembles a model of bulk magnetism called the 
“Spin-Glass”. The theory of “Spin-Glasses”(5) is itself a highly idealized description of 
bulk magnetism as represented by a collection of “atoms” each acting as a tiny dipole 
magnet by the virtue of their “Spin”. These “atoms” are in an amorphous arrangement, 
hence the “Glass” analogy. 
 
We finish this recapitulation of the subject by addressing certain criticisms brought on 
the original AB work by Galam(2,3). The main criticism seems to be semantic in nature. 
Though the term “frustration” as utilized by AB seems sensible in its particular context, it 
has a different technical meaning in the established theory of physical spin-glasses. AB 
use “frustration” in referring to the partial contribution (per unit size) of a player to the 
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total system’s energy, whereas “frustration” has a meaning pertaining to the presence of 
degenerate states in spin glasses. The use of certain concepts such as energy, have 
immutable prerequisites, as well as consequences. Such restrictions preclude the literal 
usage of kinematic quantities in anything other than physical systems. It should need no 
mention that, unless demonstrated otherwise, the loose similarities to the physical 
theory of spin-glasses should not be taken beyond colloquialisms. Another criticism(2) 
has been the constraining of the solution to only two camps. Certainly it is preferable 
that a theory provide all fundamental answers as its output. Alas, such situation is 
practically never the case in physical theories. In a fundamentally empirical discipline, 
anytime a methodology is found that even partially, but consistently, describes nature in 
more accurate detail than before, then it is worthy of further inspection even if significant 
questions remain unanswered.  
 
In the next section we review the original methodology upon which we will build our 
extensions. In section-3 we summarize our reproduction of the results from the original 
model. In section-4 we introduce the method necessary to incorporate the neutral camp 
and its consequent results. In section-5 we consider the effect of physical separation of 
the player through the notion of “affinity decay” (“out-of-sight, out-of-mind”). Both of 
these variations are found to (improve, or at least not worsen) the model’s performance 
in the case of the European war (c1939-45). We conclude with brief comments on how 
the output of this model can be connected to real-world applications such as in policy or 
military force design. 
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2. Review of the Original Methodology 
In this section we recapitulate the method by which AB computed the affinity matrix 
using historical raw data, and later the predicted alliances. Our extensions are built 
directly on this procedure, hence reviewing these prescriptions are pertinent. 
 
The key premise is that each players in a pair (i and j) has a mutual affinity Aij, for the 
other. The model posits that the affinity value shall be positive and large if the two 
nations get along well, and large negative if they have many sources of conflict or 
dissimilarity. Thus affinity is intended to be a measure of “utility” in the sense of how 
inclined two players are to be in the same camp. It is further assumed that affinity is 
symmetric, so that Aij=Aji. The latter introduces a measure of computational 
convenience, but is not fundamentally necessary. Indeed, this may be an 
oversimplification of real players. 
 
The model implements two additional assumptions drawn from the recognition that it is 
difficult for a player to assess the value of each potential alignment. The first 
assumption is that a player evaluates how well it gets along with another player 
independent of its relations with all others. The second assumption is that adjustments 
to alignments take place by incremental movement of individual players. In other words, 
the players are not going to collude and act as a unit to somehow improve their mutual 
prospects. Thus, each player remains committed to its camp equally the same as other 
players in that camp. 
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The dependent variable to be predicted was the alliance memberships as measured by 
whether a country was invaded by another country, declared war, or had war declared 
against it 
 
Consider a set of n players. The size of a player, Si > 0, is a reflection of the material 
importance of that player to others on some absolute scale. In the geopolitical context, 
the “size” might be measured by some combination of demographic, economic, 
industrial or military factors, depending on what is taken to be important in a particular 
application. 
 
A “configuration” describes the placement of each player into one (and only one) camp. 
A specific configuration, X (6), is the same as having fully specified the camp-distance, d, 
between any two players. The total discomfort Fi of player, i, in a configuration X, is the 
sum of its partial discomforts as defined by(7): 
       (1) 
 
The summation is taken over all players except j = i. The definition weights affinities to 
work with or against another player by the size of the other player. Thus, a conflict (d=1) 
or alliance (d=0) with a small player is not as important for determining alignments as an 
equivalent conflict or alliance with a large player. Summarily, we can state that if Aij > 0, 
then dij = 0 is preferred as it prevents the positive amount Aij to be added to the 
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discomfort and later to the overall system’s discomfort (or, “energy”). Conversely, if Aij < 
0, then dij = 1 is preferred as the added negative value lowers the discomfort. 
 
This model avoids higher order effects such as triplets of interaction, threshold, or non-
linear effects such as interdependent affinities. Thus, the individual discomfort Fi 
depends only on the pairwise affinities. 
 
The total energy of the configuration, X, is defined as the size-weighted sum over the 
discomfort of each player in that configuration: 
 
     (2) 
 
Hence, the energy of a configuration is lowered when players who like each other are in 
the same camp, and those disliking each other in different camps. 
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3. European War (c1939-45): The Original Case Study and its Results 
We now describe how the affinity matrix is computed using raw historical data for the 
European war (c1939-45) case study. The players are the seventeen European 
countries who were involved in major diplomatic action in the 1930s. Later in section-4, 
we will also consider several countries outside of this set. 
 
The countries selected were the five major European powers (Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy and the Soviet Union) and the twelve countries which had a formal defense or 
neutrality pact with any of them. Ostensibly, this rule was applied to avoid alliances 
which came to be as the result of the war itself. A number of  European countries were 
excluded: For example Albania because it was not independent of Italy, and Belgium 
because it had withdrawn from its defense agreement with France by 1936. A number 
of countries like Sweden did not have any treaties prior to the war. Spain was deep in 
the midst of civil war and had factions who cooperated with one or the other camp in the 
larger war. Turkey was not considered to be in Europe. The sources of alliance data are 
Singer and Small(8). The size of each country is measured with the national capabilities 
index of the Correlates of War Project(9). The national capabilities index combines six 
components of demographic, industrial and military power. 
 
Five factors were considered in computing the affinity for each pair in the player set: 
 1. the presence of recent ethnic conflict,  
 2. the similarity of the religions in the populations,  
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 3. the existence of a recent border disagreement,  
 4. the similarity of the types of governments, and  
 5. the existence of a recent history of war between the states.  
 
The scores for each category are combined with equal weights to provide a measure of 
the affinity of each pair. Selecting equal weights for the five affinity factors is the least 
subjective way of combining them and avoids introducing unknown parameters. 
 
The scores are computed as follows:  ethnic conflict, a border disagreement or a recent 
history of war between two nations counted as -1 each for their affinity. Similarity of 
religion was counted as +1 within categories (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim 
and Atheist), and -1 across major categories (Christian, Muslim, Atheist), all weighted 
by the fractions of each religion in each population. Similarity or difference of regime 
type (as one of democratic, fascist or communist) was given a score of +1 if they were 
the same type, and -1 if they were of different types. The source for ethnic conflict, 
border disagreement, history of war, and government type is Kinder and Hilgemann(10). 
Religious affiliations are given in the Correlates of War Project’s (9) Cultural Data Set for 
1930. 
 
For this study we copied the raw data from AB. The program was written so that a 
country was treated as a data-type. Thus countries can easily be added and removed 
and the data for each country was encapsulated in a database, or as text files emulating 
a database, each following the same structure. The energies of all 65,536 (=217/2) 
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possible configurations were computed and stored. The results reported by AB were 
easily reproduced over a run time of less than one second on a P3-700MHz PC. The 
global minima found are shown in Table-1. 
 
As discussed in some detail in AB(1), the 1936 result places Poland and Portugal in the 
incorrect camps compared to the sides they eventually took in 1939-40. Considering the 
historical details, and the fact that Russia invaded Poland within days of the German 
invasion, we feel that it is not unreasonable (given our definition of the observed 
alliance, i.e. the dependent variable) to consider the placement of Poland in the Axis 
camp in 1936 as not an error after all. Poland’s placement “corrected” itself by 1939. We 
further submit that the Polish “flip” is reflecting a true effect due to the dilemma in which 
she was placed, caught in the middle of two powerful enemies. This leaves only 
Portugal in the “incorrect” position both in 1936 and 1939. 1936 has two additional 
(local) energy minima shown in Table-2. 1939 has only one additional (local) energy 
minimum shown in Table-3. 
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4. Neutrality 
Ideally, the fact that by the onset of the war there were only two major camps, should be 
a result of the model itself, i.e. a spontaneous outcome. It is therefore of interest to 
explore model processes which in some way predict the number of applicable camps. 
We might envision a mechanism where any number of camps is a-priori allowed, and 
the process of approach to war somehow “freezes” the number of camps to two, or two 
plus neutrality, etc. 
 
The motivations behind such mechanism(s) might be: 
1.   Fighting many enemies is more costly compared to only one (“The enemy of my enemy 
is my friend”). 
2. It is easier finding allies when there is a common enemy, thus reducing the costs. 
3. The number of camps (as in, the fragments comprising a whole) may be a matter of the 
“resolution” with which the system is observed.   
 
The crudest procedure to incorporate the effects of the first idea above, would be to 
associate some additional energy with larger number of camps corresponding to 
savings realized in facing a common opposition. The freezing of the number of camps is 
reminiscent of the concept of “spontaneous symmetry breaking” where a symmetry 
across states is broken by systematic interactions (or fluctuations) due to effects outside 
of the model. If this loose analogy with physics holds, we are required to consider non-
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linear interactions resulting in more difficult computations. We will not explore such 
alternatives here, though it should not be ruled out for future explorations. 
 
The possibility of a neutral “camp”, however, is of sufficient practical and conceptual 
value that we find worthwhile in addressing. At first glance it might appear that the 2+1 
configuration is the same as a three-camp problem. We assert that neutrality is different 
from an additional camp with the same properties as the other two. Neutrality must have 
certain properties which cannot be the same as yet another belligerent camp, and vice-
versa. Below, we give a sketch as to why a neutral camp usually requires special 
treatment. 
 
Consider the case where there are N+1 players and one player (of unit size) which has 
the same positive affinity a, for all other N players. There are m1 players in camp-1 and 
m2 players in camp-2 (so that m1 +m2 = N). If the neutral player is placed in camp-1, the 
added energy to the overall system is F1=am2. Similarly, if it is placed in camp-2 the 
energy cost is F2=am1. In this case, the player (which would have been best described 
as neutral) is placed in the camp with the larger number of players. This could be 
construed as preferring the lesser of two evils, as it becomes belligerent to a smaller set 
of friends. At the same time, it will be required of the neutral player to oppose players for 
whom it has the same like as those it is aiding. This solution may be appropriate under 
certain circumstances, but as the cost of war is increased, the neutral parties typically 
wish to avoid any and all conflict where they have no net significant like or dislike of any 
of the available camps. Thus the need for neutrality as a camp unto itself is clear, 
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particularly in cases where the costs of war are high and/or when the weight of 
participants is relatively evenly divided between opposing camps. 
 
Consider now a “midway” camp where the distance to either camp is half of the distance 
between the other two opposing camps. In the special case of   m1 = m2 = N/2, we can 
see that the costs of placing the neutral player in camps 1, 2, and “midway” are all equal 
to aN/2. Hence there is no preference for the player to seek the midway camp. We 
might call these “degenerate” configurations. That is, different physical states with 
identical energies (harkening back to the technical definition of frustration in spin-
glasses, discussed previously in the introduction). It is easy to show that any other 
configuration (m1m2) is going to make matters worse since it will provide an incentive 
to move away from the midway camp into one or the other belligerent camps. If  m1 > 
m2, then m1 > N/2, and hence, F2>Fmidway>F1. Similarly, for m2 > m1, we find that Fmidway 
is again not the lowest cost. 
 
We therefore see the need for treating the neutral camp in a special way. The simplest 
way to break the symmetry is to designate the simultaneous distance from the neutral 
camp to each of the other camps, as anything less than half the distance between the 
other two. Though entirely incidental, we may well wonder how three points can be 
arranged so that the middle point is equidistant from the other two at distance less than 
half of that between those. The diagram in figure-1 shows how this can be achieved if 
we consider the “line” connecting the belligerent camps to be curved. Such “embedding” 
of (non-linear) interactions in the geometry rather than the Hamiltonian (e.g. Eq-2), is a 
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century-old notion. 
 
Implementing greater than two camps in the computer program is in principle simple. 
That is because the proposed case of neutrality only affects the module where the 
distance between camps is computed. However, in practice, several major modifications 
were necessary since under the two-camp restriction we were able to utilize the binary 
representation of numbers which is built in computers. The binary representation would 
be used to label a given alliance configuration using its decimal equivalent. For 
example, the configuration  “110”  represents the state where the players 1 and 2 are in 
the same camp, while the third player is in the opposing camp. We can simply represent 
(and hence easily keep track of) this configuration as the decimal equivalent of “110”, 
which is the number 6.  
 
In order to explore the three-camp problem we need to work with representations in 
base-3 which are not native to personal computers. The present version of the program 
is designed for an exhaustive search of the configuration space, and can only handle up 
to 9 camps. However, computation times and memory limits become prohibitive beyond 
three camps for seventeen players. Beyond this point, probabilistic exploration of the 
configuration space is the only practical option. 
 
After implementing the necessary changes, we positioned the neutral camp at a 
configuration-distance to the other two camps that was simultaneously less than half the 
distance between the other two. The two opposing camps were situated at a 
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configuration-distance of unity, as in the prior studies. This setup leaves open the actual 
setting of the neutral camp’s distance, since we have only speculated that it is any value 
less than ½. We have also (albeit loosely) predicted that the distance of exactly ½ 
should give the same answer as the two-camp setup. We also expect that any 
variations in energy minima as a function of neutral distance decreasing below ½ should 
go away as the effect of neutral camp assignments reach full efficacy. How far below ½ 
must di0 go for neutrality to appear, has a meaning which we will discuss shortly. 
 
On a P3-2Ghz with128Mb PC, the runtimes were approximately 80 seconds for the set 
of 15 largest countries, ~250 seconds for the 16-set, and ~1100 seconds for the full 17-
set. Surely, higher memory would have reduced the run-times further. The run-times all 
include the search for up to five local minima. The following results were obtained: 
 
 For neutral camp distance (di0) values of 0.0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, and values up to 
0.44, the same global minimum was found. This minimum was the same as the two-
camp model except with Portugal placed in the Neutral camp by itself. The camps 
contained the same results as AB’s except for Portugal which by itself occupied the 
neutral camp in both 1936 and 1939 (see Table-4). 
  
 Starting with the 13-set, and adding the eliminated players in descending order of size, 
they were found to be in the same camp as they were found in with the 17-set, without 
altering the other results, except for an overall small shift in energy values. This 
consistency is surely in large part because of their small sizes, and at least in some part 
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due to the basic stability of the model which must not be taken for granted.
 
 With either of the 13-set, 15-set, or the 17-set the same result was obtained with or 
without affinity decay (~2000km, defined in section-5) which previously was found to 
be a possible explanation for Portugal’s erroneous placement in the German camp.
 
 Using the 13-set, 15-set or the 17-set in 1936, the global minimum energies for the 
neutral distances: di0 { 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4} showed a variation of less than 
0.3%. Therefore we saw little or no variation in the minimum energy as a function of di0.
 
 No local minima were seen for the reduced set trials, except for the case of di0 =0.25 
with the 13-set, where Britain was placed with Portugal in the neutral camp in a local 
minimum. The latter case had a significantly higher energy (-55.7) relative to the Global 
value (-64.26). This local minimum was only seen if affinity-decay (defined in section-5) 
was also included. Historically, Britain’s consternation in picking sides is well known(11), 
but the fickleness of this result by itself, makes it a questionable prediction. We found 
another example of a peculiar local minimum which is quite non-robust. For di0 =0.25 
and no affinity decay, we can find Germany and Russia in the same camp. Indeed there 
was a very short lived treaty between The Germans and Soviets(12). The 17-set with 
affinity decay did not give this local minimum.
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 With either the full or the reduced sets, when di0 = 0.5, the same solutions as the two-
camp setup were found. This was true with or without affinity decay which (for di0 < 0.5), 
caused the placement of Portugal (see section-5). Not surprisingly, regardless of the 
number of camps allowed, the absolute value of minimum energies were the same. 
However, the two-camp model did have local minima, as discussed previously. No local 
minima were seen with the 2+1 camps when di0 = 0.5.
 
 For the 1939 data with either the full or the reduced sets, when including affinity decay 
(=2000km), and di0<0.5, only Poland moves to the British camp. This configuration has 
quite a low energy at E =-88.3, compared to E=-64.3 in 1936. If we take the usual sense 
of lowering of energy, this suggests that the players became more entrenched, or 
otherwise more comfortable, in their positions by 1939. No local minima were found in 
this case. 
 
 
In the above discussion we have restricted ourselves to the range di0 <0.5, but one may 
wonder about  di0 >0.5. The latter satisfies all the necessary requirements we set out for 
the former, and geometrically corresponds to the points on the vertical symmetry axis of 
figure-1 above the curved manifold, or points well below the horizontal midpoint. Indeed 
the case of di0 <0.5 corresponds to a camp which has nearly equal but positive affinity 
for the other two camps. Meanwhile di0 >0.5 implies neutrality for similar dislike for the 
belligerent camps. However, in our case study, because we have primarily allowed 
sources of dislike between the players, we can expect that allowing a double-dislike 
  
Page 20 of  39 
neutral camp opens the door to instabilities. Three of the five sources of affinity listed in 
section-3 are purely sources of negative affinity, and do not have counter-balancing 
sources. Actual investigation of the range di0 >0.5 confirms the expected instabilities in 
the form of strong sensitivity (non-robustness) of results to the precise of value of di0. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to keep the possibility of di0 >0.5 open in problems 
where it applies. There is no reason why both “neutral” camps cannot exist at the same 
time. 
 
It is important to note that our model per se does not necessarily imply any sort of 
cooperation between the members of the neutral camp, nor even among the members 
of the belligerent camps. Indeed the actual Axis members (including Japan) did 
relatively little to coordinate or enjoin their ventures. Though to a lesser extent, this was 
also true of the Allied. Nonetheless, one may wonder about the possibility for 
incorporating neutrality so as to allow for each player to occupy its own individual 
neutral camp. This idea was first tested by Galam(2), using equidistant camps (di0 =1), 
where no difference was found relative to the two-camp setup. In that study, the 
distance from any player to any other player was unity, unless the other player was in its 
camp. However, all “neutral” players also have unit distance among them. We 
confirmed the results of this study, but also explored the possibility that even these 
singleton neutrals can have a distance less than unity to all others. In this case, for di0 
<0.37 Portugal moves into the neutral camp all by itself. 
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The thresholds necessary on di0  for a country to become neutral can be understood as 
follows. Suppose that after the configuration with the minimum energy has been found, 
we compute by-camp totals of the energy of each country (i.e. as paired with all the 
members in each of the 2+1 camps). That is, given the values Wij=SiSjAij (for A at 
minimum energy) produce three pieces of data (w0, w1, and w2) for each country 
showing its total weighted-affinity for the 2+1 camps in the minimum energy solution. 
For instance without affinity decay in 1939, Italy typically shows total weighted affinity 
w0=+0.09 for the neutral camp, w1=-8.14 for the Allied camp as a whole, and w2=+1.29 
when summed over the Axis members. Clearly, by placing Italy in the Axis camp the 
contribution of -8.14 d21 +0.09 d20 (~-8.1) will lower the total system energy the most. In 
this way we can identify potential candidates for the neutral camp as those who have 
total weighted affinities for the two non-neutral camps which have both positive 
weighted-affinities (w1>0, and w2>0). Portugal in 1939 is one such example with 
weighted affinities of w0=0 for neutral (as it is its only member), w1=+.144 for the Allied 
and, w2=+.195 for the Axis. For the minimum energy then we must have  di0 (wL+ ws)< 
ws  where wL, and ws are the larger and the smaller of w1, and w2, respectively. So for a 
country with positive total affinity for both camps to become neutral we must have:0< di0 
<ws /(wL+ ws). For the values typical for Portugal we obtain 0<di0 <0.44 which is in 
agreement with the observed behavior reported above. At exactly the balance point  wL 
= ws  the full range 0< di0 <0.5 produces neutrality, it is not likely that real world data will 
produce an exact balance quantitatively. Therefore, we can see that the maximal value 
of di0 is a measure of tolerance in the model for imbalance of affinity when a player is a 
candidate for neutrality. We tested this for another candidate of neutrality: Sweden. The 
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imbalance for Sweden in 1939 was much larger in favor of the Axis camp: w0=0, 
w1=+.129 =ws , and w2=+.675 =wL. These values predict 0<di0 <0.16 for neutrality. 
Indeed, over this range for di0, Sweden is seen in the neutral camp together with 
Portugal, and in the Axis camp for di0 >0.16 (13).  Thus we can identify the neutrality 
candidates for any setting di0 slightly below ½ , then move on to calculate the threshold 
as above, and further we can predict the leanings of a formally neutral player based on 
how far below ½ is the value of the threshold on di0. 
 
Predictions for Belgium, Norway, and Luxembourg in the Allied camp, are in agreement 
with observation in 1939. However, Switzerland was not found to be a candidate for 
neutrality as we found in the case of Sweden and Portugal; it was found squarely in the 
Allied camp. Arguably, this model is not sufficient for whatever describes the formal 
neutrality of Switzerland(14).
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5. On Physical Separation of Players 
The main reason for the prediction of Portugal’s alignment with the Axis camp in the AB 
(two-camp) model, was the higher religious overlap between Portugal and the Axis 
camp, relative to that with the Allied. One can argue that the Portugal anomaly is due to 
lack of accounting for the strong economic ties between Portugal and Britain. The AB 
model did not account for the economic interdependence of players. As a result, it might 
have overvalued affinities based on religious similarity as the only direct source of 
cultural affinity or lack-thereof. However, because detailed economic data for the 1936-
39 period is scant at best, it is not be possible to build a sufficiently quantitative 
measure of economic interdependence. On the other hand, we may well speculate that 
the economic interdependence itself is a consequence of religious, cultural, and 
governmental affinities. Therefore, gross implications of economic dependencies may 
be already embedded in the factors which we have incorporated. Hence, a detailed 
model of economic factors should only contribute to the finer aspects of the predictions. 
Portugal’s anomalous alignment in a two-camp model, may well be such a “fine” 
adjustment, and possibly below some sort of noise level we have yet to establish.  
 
Notwithstanding, we would like to see if concepts simpler than economic details, of a 
type not incorporated in the previous incarnation of the method can explain the 
anomaly. The AB-model assumed that affinities were independent of the physical-
distance between the players. It seems compelling, if not necessary, to allow a 
reduction of affinities (both positive and negative) when the players are far apart relative 
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to those who are near one another. We therefore consider an exponential damping term 
by which affinities decay as a function of physical separation. The new definition of the 
discomfort for each player becomes: 
    
F X S e A d Xi j
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ij( ) ( )/= −
≠

λ
   (3) 
Where, ri j is the physical distance between the players, i and j. For this study we simply 
measured the straight line distance between the nearest border points of state pairs.  
is a characteristic distance over which the decay of affinity takes place. Therefore a 
large value of  implies less dampening of affinity over the pairwise separation, and 
smaller values makes the players more introverted. More explicitly, the affinity is halved 
for every ln2, for example if =1500km, then the affinity will halve for every ~1000km of 
separation. 
 
The exponential form is not the only form of decrease over distance. A form such as /r 
or (/r)2 could just as easily been used. Some have called this type of reduction of 
interaction the “gravity” model of social systems. The exponential term is superior if only 
because of its regular behavior at r=0. 
 
Except for the additional exponential term, the computation of Aij and dij were left 
unchanged from the AB model. For 2600> (km) >1200, and straight line distance data 
for the seventeen European countries in 1936, the model resulted only in Portugal 
changing camps at the global energy minimum, as shown in Table-5. We have found 
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four regimes for the values of . These are listed for the 1936 data in the table-6. As 
expected there exists a limiting value, above which the AB model with no affinity decay 
is obtained; this value was found to be comfortably large at 2600km. Most significantly 
observe that the response to variations in  is quite smooth, affecting only the players 
that are teetering on the edge of a switch. Eventually at very small , we see the result 
degenerate into a multitude of minima with the global energy not especially distinct 
relative to the local minima. As expected from Eq.(3), for “very small” , the energy 
contributions get smaller across the board except for nearest neighbors, thus nullifying 
the effect of sociological data except for a small subset of pairs. The observed behavior 
satisfies our original intention to test the stability of the basic model by adding a wholly 
new kind of variable. Nevertheless, we further discuss the utility of the affinity decay on 
its own merit below. 
 
We have posited that the very real notion of “out-of-sight, out-of-mind” implies that  is 
not infinite. As  increases, the world “gets smaller” (to borrow the common parlance), 
ostensibly due to technology. However, as alluded, “overly small” values of  should not 
be expected given a good level of communications and transportation technology in 
1936. Alas, there seems to be no objective way to set or compute this value apriori(15). 
How then, do we select the appropriate value? Even then, how would we know that it 
represents reality, so that it is usable for practical purposes? 
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The only conclusive way to corroborate any value of  would be to test its implications 
on many other situations uncorrelated with the current case study. Nevertheless, no 
fewer than three other broad criteria can be used to subjectively judge the plausibility of 
a given value: 
 
 1.  reflects a characteristic of human behavior. Among the few advantages of 
quantifying the sociological compared to physical systems, is the fact that model 
parameters can reasonably well be judged subjectively. Hence, we should be able to 
make some sort of assessment as to whether the actual value of  is sensible or not(15). 
 
 2. The hypothesis posited (in Eq.(3)) is that there is an exponential decay of 
affinities over physical separation. We will consider the hypothesis unusable if only a 
narrow range for  produces the observed answer (non-robustness). Hence we will 
require that a reasonably wide range of values of  should give the same answers. 
Indeed, we will see that this is the case. 
 
 3. The affinity-decay hypothesis is less tenable if it produces the observed results 
only when a different -value is used for each player. In other words, it would be 
necessary to say that people in one state tend to have very different sense of (dis-
)connection with people in other lands. This requirement is explicitly reflected in 
equation (3) which admits only a single value for all players. Any possibility of secular 
technological variations among players is implicit in the (second) requirement above. 
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We submit that, for our present purposes and considering the 1930's era, the second 
row in table-6 satisfies all three requirements reasonably well.  
 
The notion of decay of affinities, though plausible, seems relatively arbitrary in the class 
of easy additions to the original model which we could have considered. The lesson 
learned has been less about getting Portugal right, and more that the results produced 
by the energy-minimization method are so-far consistent and plausible under rather a 
non-trivial variation on the original theme. Yet, assuredly, this is not the last word on the 
matter one way or another. More demonstrations that the methodology does not unravel 
under close scrutiny will be needed to increase confidence in its viability. 
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6. Epilogue 
Using an energy-minimization model, we have been able to predict with little or no 
deviation from observation, the alliance configuration for the war in Europe (c1939-45) 
using only the data available in 1936 and 1939. 
 
We have shown that the energy-minimization methodology for predicting plausible 
alliances does not unravel by the inclusion of certain compelling and non-trivial 
changes. Indeed, the model results stay quite consistent. Compelling extensions such 
as a neutral camp improve the accuracy of the model in the case of the European war 
(c1939-45). Axelrod and Bennett have described applications of this method in other 
settings(1). It will be of great interest to see if the ideas presented here, particularly that 
of neutrality, produce agreement with observation in other subfields. Mounting bits of 
evidence are the mainstay of inductive reasoning in the empirical realm. As models 
based on novel concepts inch closer to acceptability by virtue of their accuracy, their 
utility is promulgated by more than merely their simple applications; they push the 
frontiers of a field’s dogma.  
 
From the strictly applied point of view the results of such quantitative models are quite 
significant. For example, military planners would greatly benefit from the foreknowledge 
of such information since the lead-time for military preparations and procurement is the 
weakest link in war planning. The local minima can serve to point out less “likely”(16) 
frames in plausible scenarios, so that planners can be prepare for contingencies given 
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all plausible cases. A good example of this in our case-study, is the possibility of Britain 
making peace or allying with Germany which appeared in local minima of the two-camp 
problem with affinity decay. The popular historical accounts of the period do not leave 
much room for this despite the historical record (11). In such an event, the US and her 
allies would have had to plan for a vastly different conflict for which they may not at all 
have been prepared otherwise. 
 
More generally, the last observation brings us to the most important applications of 
quantitative models such as this. In situations with overwhelming uncertainty, predicting 
the most likely (in whatever sense) configuration of the system is of little more than 
novelty value. In situations such as war, the notion of preparing only for the most likely 
configuration is not a wise option. Planning for some form of average outcome (mean, 
mode, etc) is inadequate where we get but one single shot at a realization. Under 
overwhelming complexity, the utility of a quantitative model is primarily in revealing the 
range of plausible solutions. Furthermore, one can then design a “robust policy” defined 
as one that is proportionally responsive to the widest range of plausible scenarios. 
Indeed this general approach can be applied to a wide variety of circumstances in policy 
making(17)  where “failure is not an option”. 
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Config. (X) 1936-Global Minimum (E = -94.2) 1939-Global Minimum (E = -128.1) 
“Allied” Britain  France  Czech  Denmark  Greece 
USSR  Yugoslavia  
Britain  France  Czech  Denmark  Greece 
USSR  Yugoslavia  Poland   
“Axis” Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania  Poland  
Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania  Finland Portugal 
Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania  
Estonia 
Latvia  Lithuania  Finland  Portugal 
Table-1: Axelrod and Bennett’s global minima for 1936 and 1939. 
 
Table-2: Axelrod and Bennett’s found two local minima for 1936. 
 
 
Config. (X) 1936-Local Minimum 1  (E =-91.0) 1936-Local Minimum 2 (E = -89.2) 
Alliance-1 Greece  USSR  Yugoslavia  France  Czech  Greece  USSR   
Yugoslavia  
Alliance-2 Britain  France  Czech  Denmark  
Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania   
Poland  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania   
Finland Portugal 
Britain  Denmark  Poland   Germany   
Italy  Hungary  Rumania  Estonia  Latvia 
Lithuania  Finland 
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Table-3: Axelrod and Bennett found only this local minimum for 1939. 
 
Config. (X) 1936 Global Minimum 1939 Global Minimum 
“Allied” Britain  France  Czech  Denmark 
Greece  USSR  Yugoslavia   
Britain  France  Czech  Denmark 
Greece  USSR  Yugoslavia  Poland   
“Axis” Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania   
Poland Estonia Latvia  Lithuania   
Finland 
Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania   
Estonia Latvia  Lithuania  Finland 
Neutral Portugal Portugal 
Table-4: Global minima found in this work after including a neutral camp. 
 
Config. (X) 1939-Local Minimum 1  (E = -111.4) 
Alliance-1 Greece  USSR  Yugoslavia  Poland  
Alliance-2 Britain  France  Czech  Denmark Germany   
Italy  Hungary  Rumania  Estonia  Latvia   
Lithuania  Finland Portugal 
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Config. (X) 1936 Global Minimum 1939 Global Minimum 
“Allied” Britain  France  Czech  Denmark   
Greece  USSR  Yugoslavia  Portugal 
Britain  France  Czech  Denmark   
Greece  USSR  Yugoslavia  Poland   
Portugal 
“Axis” Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania   
Poland  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania   
Finland 
Germany  Italy  Hungary  Rumania   
Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania  Finland 
Table-5: Affinity decay (2600km>>1200km) resulted in only Portugal moving to the Allied camp 
compared to the original AB global minima. 
Table-6: Different ranges for the characteristic length of affinity decay for 1936 resulted in few 
changes in the global minimum. 
 
 
Decay Length,  (km) Deviation: Global minimum v. History Comments 
  > 2600 
(note: AB= ) 
Portugal in the Axis Camp 
(reproduces AB results) 
2 local minima: both “plausible”. 
1200 <   <2600 None 2-3 local minima: all “plausible” 
800 <  <1200 Portugal and Rumania in Allied Camp 3 local minima 
<800 Only Germany, Italy, and  USSR in  
Axis Camp 
 Many local minima 
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Figure 1- Geometric depiction of the neutral camp's position. 
 
